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Abstract 
We study the effect of dividend taxes on the payout and investment policy of listed firms and 
discuss their implications for agency problems. To do so, we exploit a unique setting in 
Switzerland where some, but not all, firms were suddenly able to pay tax-exempted dividends 
to their shareholders following the corporate tax reform of 2011. Using a difference-in-
differences specification, we show that treated firms increased their payout by around 30% 
compared to control firms after the tax cut. Differently, treated firms did not concurrently or 
subsequently increase investment. We show that the tax-inelasticity of investment was due to a 
significant drop in retained earnings  ̶  as the rise in dividends was not compensated by an 
equally-sized reduction in share repurchases. Furthermore, treated firms did not raise more 
equity than control firms. Lastly, we show that an unintended consequence of cutting dividend 
taxes is to mitigate the agency problems that arise between insiders and minority shareholders. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Does changing dividend taxes materially affect firms’ behavior? Pro-business politicians, 
in line with the neoclassic theory of corporate dividend taxation (Poterba and Summers, 1985), 
claim that lowering dividend tax reduces cost of equity and boosts investment and payout in 
the long run. Differently, surveys of corporate executives (Brav, Graham, Harvey and 
Michaely, 2008), along with the Miller and Modigliani (1961) payout irrelevance proposition, 
suggest that reducing dividend taxes has very little or no effect on payout decisions. Given 
these opposing views, it becomes an empirical question whether fiscal shocks on dividends 
materially affect the payout and investment policy of firms. However, the main empirical 
challenge stems from the fact that fiscal shocks affect all firms simultaneously and that payout 
and investment are pro-cyclical. In such a case, it becomes virtually impossible to tease out the 
causal effect of a tax cut, which inherently limits the policy implications of empirical studies. 
In this paper, we study the effect of abruptly removing the dividend tax for some, but not 
all, firms by exploiting a fiscal shock that occurred in Switzerland in 2011. This shock was an 
unintended consequence of a corporate tax reform allowing small and medium size companies 
to repay capital contributions made by their shareholders, and that no tax would be due on these 
repayments. When implementing the reform, the Federal Tax Authority rather surprisingly 
stated that any company incorporated in Switzerland would be allowed to pay tax-exempted 
dividends (hereafter TED) to their shareholders from their capital contributions. Using a 
difference-in-differences specification, we can then compare the payout and investment policy 
of firms being affected by the reform (i.e., firms with some reserve from capital contributions 
or 46% of all public firms) with those of firms that are not (i.e., firm without any reserve from 
capital contributions).The quasi-experimental nature of this fiscal reform offers a unique setup 
to test whether the tax cut causally affects firms’ financial decisions.  
Existing empirical evidence on the effect of dividend tax cuts on firms’ payout policy is 
mixed. Poterba (2004) reports a strong positive long-run (but no short-run) elasticity of 
dividends with respect to the tax burden on dividends. Chetty and Saez (2005) show that the 
enactment of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 significantly led 
publicly traded corporations to increase their dividends right after the tax cut. However, Brown, 
Liang and Weisbenner (2007) show that share repurchases went down at the same time, which 
left total payout unaffected by the tax cut. Differently, Hubbard and Michaely (1997) show that 
investors seem to ignore taxation when pricing a stock paying a cash dividend (heavily taxed) 
and a clone stock paying a stock dividend (lightly taxed). Furthermore, Brav, Graham, Harvey 
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and Michaely (2008) indicate that more than two-thirds of US executives stated that the 2003 
dividend tax reduction would definitely or probably not affect their dividend decisions. 
Recently, Jacob and Michaely (2017) show that conflicting objectives between owners and 
managers dampen the sensitivity of payout policy to dividend taxation. 
The question of the effect of dividend taxes on investment also remains unsettled. Using 
data on dividends and capital gain taxes from 25 countries, Becker, Jacob and Jacob (2013) 
find that, after dividend tax cuts, firms with limited internal equity increase their investment 
relative to firms with plenty of internal equity. On the other hand, Yagan (2015) finds that the 
2003 US dividend tax cut had no impact on firms’ investment over the subsequent five years. 
Evidence from Sweden provided by Alstadsæter, Jacob and Michaely (2017) lie between these 
two views: they show that aggregate investments did not increase following the local tax cut 
of 2006 but that cash-constrained firms did increase external equity and investment more 
relative to cash-rich firms. 
We believe we are in an ideal position to contribute to this important debate. Indeed, the 
Swiss tax reform studied in this paper has several desirable characteristics that allow us to avoid 
common problems that arise when estimating the effects of tax changes on payout and 
investment: 
- The tax cut affected some, but not all, firms incorporated in Switzerland. As we explain 
below, only firms with a certain type of reserves were allowed to pay TED to their 
shareholders. As a result, we make use of a sample of control firms to filter out the effects 
of the business cycle on firms’ payout and investment policy. Without such a control, it 
remains challenging to draw any causal inference between a tax change and observed 
outcomes (Chetty and Saez, 2005).  
- The tax cut was unexpected – While initially targeting small and medium-sized enterprises, 
the 2011 fiscal reform also had some important unintended consequences on public firms. 
In particular, it allows some of them to pay TED.1  
- The tax cut was sudden – Firms only had a few months to benefit from the tax cut in 2011 
and several eligible firms were forced to wait until 2012 to benefit from it.2 As a result, 
Swiss companies were unable to anticipate the shock. 
                                                 
1 The fact that public companies could pay TED came as a surprise and was never mentioned in the debates prior 
to the enforcement of the fiscal reform. 
2 As discussed below, the fact that some eligible firms had to wait for one more year to benefit from the reform is 
going to strengthen the identification strategy. 
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- The tax cut was massive – As the maximum marginal tax rate dropped from 36.2% to zero, 
this is the most important dividend tax cut we are aware of. Thus, the incentives implied 
by this reform are economically important.3 
- The tax cut was permanent – The Swiss tax cut of 2011 was always presented as being 
permanent, unlike for instance the US tax cut of 2003 that carried a default expiration date 
after a few years.4  
- The overall reform includes no concurrent changes to the income tax or capital gains tax, 
and no other tax advantages on investments – Such concurrent changes would be a threat 
to the internal validity of the empirical design. 
Given the key role played by the equity channel in the relationship between dividend taxes 
and investment, we focus in this paper on public firms, which turns out to be an advantage. 
Indeed, unlike private firms, public firms enjoy a direct access to equity markets.5 Furthermore, 
for private firms, dividends are just one component of the total compensation of shareholders 
as the latter are also often involved in the management of the firms and receive compensations.6 
The actual breakdown between dividends and compensation mainly depends on the relative tax 
rates between the two types of payments. Fortunately, we do not have to worry about such 
substitution when dealing with public firms. 
Our empirical analysis proceeds in three main steps and leads to the following findings. 
First, we study the impact of the tax cut on the payout policy of firms. By contrasting treated 
and control firms, both graphically and using regressions, we document that the reaction to the 
shock was immediate and both statistically and economically large (around +30%). We find 
consistent results by considering various dimensions of the payout policy: dividend yield, 
dividend payout, total payout, as well as the percentage of firms paying dividends. Our findings 
remain robust when we shorten the sample period or change the composition of our sample by 
removing some firms (e.g. large ones, small ones, and financials). In an auxiliary test, we also 
                                                 
3 As a mean of comparison, the top marginal federal dividend income tax rate went from 38.6% to 15% in the 
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003. As a result, one may wonder whether the investment 
inelasticity reported by Yagan (2015) may be due to too low an initial fiscal shock. 
4 As of today (January 2019), Swiss companies can still pay tax-exempt dividends and some firms have done so 
every year since 2011. 
5 Lack of access to equity financing is particularly problematic for the S-corps studied by Yagan (2015) as they 
are prevented by law from having any institutional equity financing and from having more than 100 shareholders. 
Other recent papers studying the effects of dividend tax cuts on private firms’ financial decisions include Jacob 
and Michaely (2017) and  Berzins, Bøhren and Stacescu (2018). 
6 For instance in Norway, 73% of the CEOs of the private firms studied by Berzins, Bøhren and Stacescu (2018) 
are members of the controlling family. 
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contrast treated firms with others that, although being theoretically eligible, had to wait until 
2012 before their eligibility was recognized by the Swiss Fiscal Authority. This group of firms 
constitutes an ideal control sample as they are similar to the firms treated in 2011 - they were 
just late by one year. We find consistent results in this alternative setting. 
Second, we measure the real effects of the tax cut on firms’ investments. Overall, we find 
no difference between the investment policies of treated and control firms in our sample. Not 
only we extend the conclusion of Yagan (2015) to public firms, but we also aim to identify the 
channel at play. We show that the absence of real effects can be attributed to a significant drop 
in retained earnings, which is caused by the increase in the total payout of treated firms. Indeed, 
we find that the rise in dividends is not compensated by an equally sized drop in share 
repurchases. Furthermore, treated firms do not raise more capital, through seasoned equity 
offerings, than control firms. 
Third, we show that reducing dividend taxes also has non-trivial implications for agency 
problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). We find that the treated firms that are the most exposed 
to agency concerns, as they have no monitoring blockholders and use dual-class share structure 
or voting right restrictions, are the most reactive to the tax cut. As they strongly and 
permanently reduce retained earnings after the tax cut, managers will end up with fewer 
resources to spend on wasteful projects. As a result, while politicians typically justify dividend 
tax cuts by promises of increased investment, consumption, and economic growth, our 
evidence suggests that the main advantage of tax cuts for society may lie somewhere else: they 
mitigate agency problems within firms. 
Our main contribution to the literature is to identify and exploit a unique set-up allowing us 
to provide a more clear-cut answer to the important, and so far unsettled, question of the effects 
of dividend taxes on firms’ payout and investment policy. We believe our identification 
strategy to be as close as it gets from a proper controlled experiment, which allows us to make 
causal statements about the financial and real effects of corporate taxes. Furthermore, our study 
is to the best of our knowledge, the first empirical study on the effects of a dividend tax cut on 
public firms using a control sample of unaffected, yet similar, firms.7 A final contribution is to 
document empirically a channel between dividend taxes and agency costs. 
                                                 
7 Chetty and Saez (2005) also study public firms but their “control sample” was made of treated firms which, 
given their ownership structure, were supposed to be less affected by the tax cut. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we derive our testable hypotheses 
from standard corporate finance theories. We present in Section 3 the Swiss corporate tax 
system and the fiscal shock we focus on. We describe our data in Section 4. Section 5 presents 
the effects of the dividend tax cut on the payout and investment policy of Swiss companies and 
Section 6 discusses the implication of the tax cut for agency problems. Finally, Section 7 
concludes our study. 
 
2 THEORY AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
The neoclassic theory of corporate dividend taxation, known as the “old view”, states that 
reducing dividend taxes mechanically reduces the firms’ cost of equity and boosts investment 
(Harberger, 1962, 1966; Feldstein, 1970; Poterba and Summers, 1985; Poterba, 2004). In this 
theory, the marginal source of funds for investment is the new shares issued. Reducing the tax 
rates on dividends lowers the required rate of the return of shareholders, which is the cost of 
equity of the firm. This drop in the cost of equity mechanically turns the Net Present Value 
(NPV) of some investment projects from negative to positive, hence boosting capital 
expenditures. Such an increase in investment is funded by raising new equity, typically through 
seasoned equity offerings. 
According to this theory, dividend payout is not supposed to react to a tax cut in the short-
run but it should increase with time, once the positive effects of the new investments have 
materialized. Firms may, however, decide to immediately increase their dividend to signal that 
their earnings are expected to increase in the future (Bernheim, 1991). Similarly, in the agency 
model of Chetty and Saez (2010), a dividend tax cut leads to an immediate increase in dividend 
payments because it increases the manager’s preference for dividends relative to unproductive 
investments, and especially so if the manager also owns equity. In order to test the 
aforementioned theories, we state our first hypothesis: 
H1: Dividend payout increases after a dividend tax cut.  
Other standard theories claim that H1 should not hold. For instance, the “new view” developed 
by King (1974), Auerbach (1979), Bradford (1981), and Auerbach (2002) concludes that 
dividend taxes should have no impact on dividends and investment. Under this view, even if 
the firm distributes all its earnings to its shareholders, it can still fund its positive NPV projects 
with cash and without having to issue new equity. Differently, the payout irrelevance 
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proposition of Modigliani and Miller (1961) states that altering the mix between retained 
earnings and payout has no impact on firm value. When dividends are taxed more heavily than 
capital gains, the optimal policy is to pay no dividends. In such a case, share repurchases offer 
an attractive alternative to cash dividends as the generated cash flows are taxed as capital gains. 
Generally speaking, lowering the dividend tax rate should trigger a substitution between 
dividends (↑) and share repurchases (↓). In order to assess the net effect of the changes in cash 
dividends and share repurchases, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H2: Total payout increases after a dividend tax cut. 
H2 corresponds to a situation where dividends are more reactive with respect to the tax cut 
than share repurchases. In other words, the positive change in dividends dominates the negative 
change in share repurchases. If reducing dividend taxes leads to a higher total payout, it also 
mechanically reduces the retained earnings (∆R < 0) available to fund new investments (Doidge 
and Dyck, 2015). In such a case, in order to be able to increase investment, firms must 
simultaneously raise equity (∆E > 0). This is the main channel in the neoclassical model of 
dividend taxes as the tax cut is supposed to mechanically reduce the cost of equity and to boost 
investment. We test the equity channel and the effect of the tax cut on investments using H3 
and H4. These pair of hypotheses will allow us to test whether corporate tax shocks have any 
real effect on the economy. 
H3: Firm’s investment increases after a dividend tax cut. 
H4: Firms raise new equity after a dividend tax cut. 
 Before we formally test these four hypotheses, we provide some information about the 
Swiss tax system, the natural experiment we consider in this paper, and our data. We do so in 
the next two sections. 
 
3 CORPORATE TAXES IN SWITZERLAND AND THE NATURAL EXPERIMENT  
3.1 The Swiss corporate tax system 
This section describes the tax treatment of dividends, share repurchases, and capital gains 
for the various types of shareholders in Switzerland. There are two main features of the Swiss 
corporate tax system that one needs to be aware of. First, whenever a Swiss corporation pays 
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dividends to its shareholders (domestic and foreign), it has to directly pay a withholding tax to 
the fiscal authorities that corresponds to 35% of the amount of dividends, i.e., investors only 
receive 65% of the gross dividend. They then have to claim back the withholding tax once they 
have declared and paid taxes on their income.8 Second, taxes must be paid at the municipal, 
cantonal (state), and Federal levels and, consequently, the overall fiscal burden depends on the 
domicile of the fiscal subject. This multi-layer system is similar to the US tax system in which 
individuals not only have to pay Federal taxes but in most cases also state and municipal taxes 
on income and dividends.  
In Switzerland, taxes on dividends depend on the fiscal status of the shareholder who 
receives them. There are four different types. The first three correspond to categories of 
domestic investors whereas the last one applies to investors who do not have their legal 
domicile in Switzerland. 
- Individual investors: Dividends are taxed as ordinary income while capital gains are not 
taxed.9 The top marginal personal income tax rate was 36.3% for this category of 
investors.10 
- Corporations: Dividends on stocks held by corporations are taxed as ordinary corporate 
income. Capital gains are taxed at the same rate, i.e., 21.2%.11 If a company holds more 
than 20% of the equity of another company, it benefits from a tax reduction on dividends. 
- Tax-exempted investors: Institutional investors, such as pension funds and investment 
funds, do not pay taxes on dividends and capital gains. Other tax-exempted shareholders 
include government organizations at any level (Federal, cantonal or municipal), charitable 
organizations, and international organizations. 
- Foreign investors: Dividends distributed to foreign investors are subject to the 35% 
withholding tax. Foreign investors can then reclaim this tax if they declare these revenues 
in their home country and if their country has signed an agreement with Switzerland in 
order to avoid double taxation. 
                                                 
8 The withholding tax system is not unique to the Swiss setting and can be found in the United States and in 23 
out of the 28 European Union member states. However, in contrast to most of these countries, the withholding tax 
in Switzerland is not limited to foreign entities but applies to all investors whether domestic or foreigners.  
9 There is an exception for individuals obtaining more revenues from trading securities than from their own labor 
income. Fiscal authorities treat these individuals as professional traders and impose capital gains as income. 
10 Source: OECD Tax database website. This rate is for an investor located in the city of Zurich for the year 2010. 
11 Source: OECD Tax database website. This rate is for a firm located in the city of Zurich for the year 2010. 
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As there are no taxes on capital gains in Switzerland, share repurchases appear a priori as a 
more tax-efficient way for a firm to transfer cash to shareholders. However, the tax treatment 
of share repurchases depends on the goal of the share repurchase program. On the one hand, if 
firms keep the repurchased shares as treasury stocks (to use them at a later date) then they are 
taxed as capital gains and they are an attractive alternative to dividends. On the other hand, if 
companies repurchase shares in order to cancel them, the difference between the repurchase 
price and the nominal value of the stock is taxed at the same rate as a dividend.12  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
We see in Figure 1 that dividends are the dominant form of payout in Switzerland. The 
fraction of firms paying dividends increased steadily until the great recession, with a maximum 
of 63% of the firms paying dividends in 2008. Even if dividends are known to be sluggish at 
the firm level, aggregate dividends fluctuate according to the business cycles. For instance, the 
drop in the payout of Swiss companies after 2008 corresponds to a period of weak economic 
conditions, and even to a period of negative GDP growth between 2008Q3 and 2009Q1. The 
impact of this recession was more severe on the investment of Swiss companies as the fixed 
gross capital formation dropped by CHF5 billion (-15%) over the same three quarters. The 
sensitivity of both payout and investments to business-cycle conditions reinforce the 
importance of having a control sample (as we do) when testing the effect of a fiscal shock on 
payout and investments. Otherwise, observed swings in dividends or investments could be 
wrongly attributed to the fiscal shock. 
We notice that share repurchases are not a widespread phenomenon across public firms in 
Switzerland. Indeed, on average, only 6.5% of Swiss corporations repurchase their shares in a 
given year. This contrasts with the behavior of publicly listed firms in the US. Over the same 
period, the proportion of US public firms repurchasing their stocks ranges between 30 and 40% 
(Farre-Mensa, Michaely and Schmalz, 2014). 
                                                 
12 Since the tax is not calculated on the difference between the repurchase price and the price paid by the investor 
to buy the share, this creates an important fiscal disadvantage for taxed investors. This is due to the fact that the 
nominal value is much lower than the current stock market price (on average less than 1%) and therefore the basis 
on which the tax burden is computed is much larger than just the capital gain (Chung, Isakov and Pérignon, 2007). 
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3.2 The Natural Experiment 
The possibility to pay TED in 2011 was an unintended consequence of the second Corporate 
Taxation Reform (CTR2) initiated by the Swiss Federal government.13 As stated by the Federal 
government, the main objective of this reform was to lower the tax burden on corporations to 
favor economic growth and stimulate employment. For instance, the Federal Council states that 
CTR2 “aims to improve the fiscal conditions for small and medium sized companies” and “to 
lower the fiscal burden that distort business decisions, and to boost economic growth and 
employment”. 
Specifically, the three main changes to the Swiss corporate tax system are: 
- To reduce the fiscal burden on firms’ capital, CTR2 introduces the capital contribution 
principle, which allows Swiss firms to exempt from withholding and income taxes the 
repayment of capital contributions made by the direct shareholders (see Figure 2). This 
change aims to eliminate the particularly unfavorable tax treatment of exits by shareholders 
of small and medium-sized enterprises – hence hurting equity issuance in the first place. 
- To dampen the double taxation of corporate earnings, CTR2 exempts 40% of the dividend 
payed to any physical person or firm owning at least 10% of a given firm. Before CTR2, 
the threshold was at 20%. Such large equity stakes are a common feature among small and 
medium-sized enterprises.  
- To simplify the reorganization and transfer of small and medium-sized enterprises, CTR2 
fully exempts from taxes any cash flows coming from the sale of production factors, such 
as vehicles or pieces of equipment. It also improves the tax treatment on corporate transfers 
or liquidations. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
The CTR2 bill was approved by the Swiss Parliament on April 13, 2007 and eventually 
enforced on January 1, 2011.14 Prior to this date, the Swiss government always presented the 
capital contribution principle as applying only to small and medium-sized enterprises. 
However, on December 9, 2010, or 23 days prior to the enforcement date of CTR2, the Swiss 
                                                 
13 The first Corporate Tax Reform (CTR1) took place in 1997, hence 10 years before the starting date of our 
sample period. The third Corporate Tax Reform (CTR3) has been accepted by the Swiss parliament in June 2016 
but it was eventually rejected in February 2017 by the Swiss people in a referendum. 
14 The entry into force of the new bill was postponed because a coalition of political parties launched a referendum 
against the new law on the ground that it would lead to substantial revenue losses for the Federal Government. 
Eventually, the Swiss people accepted the new law on February 24, 2008 with a short majority of 50.8%. 
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Federal Tax Authority published a circular describing in great detail the conditions under which 
capital contributions could be tax-exempted. In this document, the Federal Tax Authority 
explicitly considered the case of paying tax-exempted dividends out of capital contribution, a 
case never mentioned in the preceding debates. Consequently, all firms incorporated in 
Switzerland that were able to prove the existence of capital contributions were allowed to 
distribute TED to their shareholders from their paid-in capital.15 A capital contribution is 
defined as the difference between the market price and the nominal value. Such contributions 
are made either at the time of the Initial Public Offering, when new shares are issued, or when 
executives and employees exercise their stock options.16 
Since the possibility to pay tax-exempted dividends came as a surprise in December 2010, 
and the deadline to get the capital contributions approved by the Federal Tax Authority was 
very short, only a fraction of eligible companies could use this possibility in 2011.17 Actually, 
46% of all listed companies had some reserves from capital contributions recognized in 2011 
while an additional 20% had some reserves recognized in 2012. As a result, the introduction of 
the capital contribution principle in 2011 creates a natural experiment setting as the possibility 
to pay tax-free dividends was unexpected. We assign firms to the treatment group if they had 
recognized reserves from capital contribution in 2011 and were authorized to pay tax-
exempted dividends. Firms are in the control group if they did not have such reserves 
recognized by the Federal Tax Authority and hence could not pay TED in 2011. Moreover, the 
allocation of firms into one of the two groups appears to be quite exogenous as one cannot 
argue that firms increased their capital, made an Initial Public Offering or granted stock options 
on purpose since it was virtually impossible to predict the actual scope of this piece of 
legislation. 
The introduction of the tax-exemption of dividends sparked a heated political debate in the 
country. The leading newspaper in the country, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, provided detailed 
information to the public about these unexpected tax-exempted dividends.18 Furthermore, 
                                                 
15 The tax break for investors investigated in this paper applies to all Federal, cantonal, and municipal taxes. 
16 Only capital contributions from January 1, 1997 onwards were eligible for tax-free repayment from 2011 
onwards. Capital contributions had to be presented to the Federal Tax Authority at the latest 30 days after the 
approval of the 2011 fiscal year accounts. In order to do so companies had to go through their capital contributions 
for fiscal years 1997-2010, fill out a form to be sent to the Federal Tax Authority and justify their demand for the 
creation of a capital contribution account. 
17 Swiss companies are legally obliged to have their annual meeting at the latest six months after their fiscal year 
end. In our sample, 90.1% of the firms have their fiscal year-end on December 31 and must therefore hold their 
annual meeting before the end of the following June. 
18 “New laws sometimes lead to unexpected consequences. A prime example is given by the Corporate Tax 
Reform II which was adopted by a narrow majority off people in 2008. What then only appeared as a footnote in 
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several members of the Swiss Parliament tried to cancel the vote claiming that the government 
had not properly informed the citizens. In December 2011, the Swiss Supreme Court rejected 
the appeal and confirmed the new law but blamed the Federal Council for having improperly 
informed citizens before the vote.  
 
4 DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Our sample of firms includes all constituents of the broadest stock index in Switzerland, the 
Swiss Performance Index, between 2007 and 2015. On any given year, the index is made of 
around 200 firms traded on the SIX Swiss exchange. To be included in our sample, a firm has 
to be part of the index for at least one year. Consequently, we end up with an unbalanced panel 
of 264 companies, ranging from large, multi-billion multinationals (e.g. Nestlé, Novartis, UBS) 
to smaller, more local firms.19 Focusing on the major stock index’ constituents allows us to 
discard companies with a very low free float, open-end funds, or foreign firms that are cross-
listed in Switzerland. The latter would unlikely qualify as appropriate control firms in our 
empirical tests. 
While our analysis requires precise information on the tax status of the dividends for each 
firm/year, this information is typically not included in standard financial databases. We 
therefore hand-collected such information from the companies’ annual reports and 
systematically cross-checked it with the Swiss stock guide. 20 In particular, we collected the 
yearly dividend paid per share as well as its tax status: taxed or tax-exempted.21  
We also collected detailed data on the share repurchase activities of all sample firms from 
the Swiss Takeover Board (http://www.takeover.ch), which is the supervisory authority 
overseeing repurchase activities in Switzerland. Data on the length of the program and 
repurchase methods were also collected from the Swiss Takeover Board website. The actual 
                                                 
public discussions, now provides for heated debates. Since the beginning of this year dividends are free from the 
withholding and income tax when paid out from capital contributions. […] The debate these days is less about the 
system change than its retroactive effect. Contrary to the original proposal of the Federal Council, companies can 
not only have "new" capital contributions credited for future dividends. Under certain circumstances, the capital 
contributions which shareholders have paid since the beginning of 1997 can be used. […] In parliament and the 
voting debate the matter was hardly an issue. It became an issue, when this year, several major companies 
announced to pay out a tax-free dividend on the basis of the new rule.” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, March 8, 2011. 
19 When studying investment (capex) and financing options, we exclude financial firms from the sample. 
Differently, in our tests on payout, we estimate the specifications sequentially with all firms and with non-financial 
firms only. We believe including financial firms can be interesting in our setting as all financial firms in 
Switzerland, including state-owned banks, can freely choose their dividend policy.  
20 The Swiss stock guide is an annual publication presenting for all Swiss public firms a large number of financial 
information in a standardized format. 
21 Swiss firms pay dividends once a year. 
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amounts repurchased by firms were obtained from the firms' websites/annual reports, and the 
website of the Swiss stock exchange (www.six-swiss-exchange.com). 
Furthermore, all accounting data for our sample firms were obtained from Worldscope. An 
exception is the reserves from capital contribution giving the right to pay TED, which had to 
be hand collected from the firms’ annual reports. Moreover, stock price data were obtained 
from Datastream. 
Finally, we collected ownership data from the firms’ annual reports. For each firm, we have 
data on the identity and holdings of all shareholders having more than 3% of voting rights. We 
then classify firms in different categories. A firm is said to be widely held if it does not have a 
shareholder holding more than 10% of the voting rights. If the largest shareholder of a company 
has more than 10% of voting rights, the firm is considered to be owned by a controlling 
shareholder. For 63% of these firms, the blockholder is a family whereas for the remaining 
37%, the blockholder is either the State, another corporation, a pension fund, or a foundation. 
We report in Table 1 some summary statistics about all sample firms in the year preceding 
the enactment of the reform (2010). All firm characteristics and investment variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In our sample, around 70% of the firms pay a cash 
dividend to their shareholders and the average dividend yield is 2.03%. On average, a typical 
firm pays out 34.78% of its earnings in dividends, and 36.31% in dividends and/or share 
repurchases.22  
When splitting our sample between treated and control firms, we end up with two groups 
that are well balanced in terms of size (114 vs. 96 firms) and remarkably similar in terms of 
composition. Indeed, treated and control firms look very much alike as far as payout, firm 
characteristics, investment, and ownership are concerned. For instance, the dividend yield is 
2.07% for treated firms vs. 1.99% for control firms, and the total payout is 37.19% for treated 
firms vs. 35.58% for control firms. Moreover, prior to the reform, 67.71% of the treated firms 
were paying dividends vs. 70.18% of the control firms. As for investment, the capex-to-PPE 
(Property, Plant & Equipment) ratio is 20.68% for treated firms vs. 17.35% for control firms, 
and the cash-to-total-assets ratio is 17% for treated firms vs. 16.5% for control firms. For all 
considered variables, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that treated and control firms have 
the same mean. 
                                                 
22 Following Julio and Ikenberry (2004) and Von Eije and Megginson (2008), payout ratios are set to 100% if they 
are negative or if a firm distributes more than 100% of its earnings. 
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There are two dimensions though for which the two subsamples differ. The first one is size, 
as measured either by total assets or book value of equity, for which treated firms appear to 
outsize their peers. This is due to the fact that the size distribution of Swiss companies is skewed 
and that the largest ones tend to be treated.23 The second one is the fraction of firms that are 
widely-held as this feature is more common among treated firms: 40.43% vs. 28.07% for 
control firms. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
5 EFFECTS ON PAYOUT POLICY AND INVESTMENT 
5.1. Payout Policy 
We start our investigation on the effect of removing dividend taxes by comparing the 
evolution of the main payout variables for firms affected by the reform (treated firms) and those 
that are not (control firms). As explained in Section 3, to be treated, a firm must have some 
reserves from capital contributions that have been recognized by the fiscal authorities in 2011. 
On the other hand, control firms do not benefit from the dividend tax cut and can only pay 
taxed dividends to their shareholders. This setting allows us to cleanly assess the impact of 
removing the dividend tax on firms’ financial decisions.  
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
Figure 3 displays the evolution of the average dividend yield, average dividend payout, and 
of the fraction of dividend-paying firms, using the following definitions: 
dividend per sharedividend yield
stock price
= itit
it
 
dividend per sharedividend payout
earnings per share
= itit
it
  
# of dividend paying firms% of dividend paying firms  = 
# of sample firms
t
t
t
  
 
                                                 
23 If we proxy firm size by market capitalization instead of total assets, treated firms are not larger than control 
firms anymore. This is due to the fact that the market capitalization of the largest Swiss banks was very low 
compared to their book value of equity.  
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The evidence in Figure 3 is remarkable. Indeed, before the introduction of CTR2, both 
control and treated firms behave similarly. On the first year of the reform (2011), treated firms 
sharply increase their dividend yield while it remains quite stable for control firms. The 
economic magnitude of the effect appears large. Interestingly, we obtain consistent results 
when looking at the other two dimensions of the firms’ dividend payout. Furthermore, the 
evolution of the curves after the tax cut also suggests that the effect seems to be fairly persistent 
over time. We complement our analysis by analyzing total payout, which we define as: 
 
dividend per share amount per share spent for repurchasestotal payout
earnings per share
+
= it itit
it
 
 
Accounting for share repurchases allows us to have a full picture of the payout policy of the 
firms. We also display the evolution of this additional variable in Figure 3 and see that going 
from dividend payout to total payout does not materially affect the overall pattern. The payout 
ratio of treated and control firms follows a common trend prior to the reform and their evolution 
diverges significantly afterwards.24 
We then formally contrast the payout policy of treated and control firms using a difference-
in-differences setting. We estimate the following specification using OLS regressions and 
robust standard errors clustered at the industry level: 
 
 α β ′= + ⋅ + + + +it it it i t ity treated FE FE eγ X  (1) 
 
where yit is a payout variable, treatedit is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm 
is treated and the year is equal or after 2011, Xit is a vector of control variables, and FEi and 
FEt  are firm and year fixed effects. 
Such a specification appears particularly appropriate in our setting as the payout variables 
of treated and control firms follow a common trend prior to the fiscal shock (see the 2007-2010 
subperiod in Figure 3). Estimation results in Table 2 indicate that treated firms tend to increase 
dividend and total payout following the fiscal shock (columns 1, 3, 5, and 7). The beta 
                                                 
24 For completeness, we also study other payout variables considered in the literature (see Chetty and Saez, 2005): 
the percentage of firms starting to pay a dividend (first timers) and the percentage of firms increasing their 
dividends compared to the previous year. Both variables are significantly higher for treated firms in 2011 but are 
comparable in magnitude over the 2012-2015 period. Note that the effect is not expected to be permanent for these 
variables as a given firm cannot, by definition, initiate dividend payment two years in a row, and the second 
variable is in first-difference and not in level. 
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coefficient is both statistically significant at the 99% confidence level and economically 
significant. It means that treated firms increase their dividend yield after the tax cut by 0.672% 
more than control firms. This is a sizable increase as the average of the pre-reform dividend 
yield was around 2% (see Table 1): 0.672 / 2 = 33.6%. When turning to the three other payout 
variables, the pattern remains very similar: the payout ratios and the propensity to pay a 
dividend increase significantly more for treated firms after the tax cut. For instance, for 
dividend payout, the beta coefficient is 9.221 and the average payout ratio before the tax cut 
was 34.78% (see Table 1): 9.221 / 34.78 = 26.5%. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
In order to reinforce the causal explanation between the tax cut and payout policy, and to 
better understand the dynamics of the payout policy around the fiscal shock, we estimate an 
alternative specification in which we treat each year separately:  
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 0 1
2
1 0 1
2
α β β β
β
−= + ⋅ − + ⋅ + ⋅ +
′+ ⋅ + + + + +
it it it it
it it i t it
y treated treated treated
treated FE FE eγ X
 (2) 
where treatedit (-1) is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm is treated and the 
year is 2010, treatedit (0) is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm is treated and 
the year is 2011, treatedit (+1) is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm is treated 
and the year is 2012, and treatedit (2+) is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm 
is treated and the year is 2013, 2014, or 2015. 
Such a specification allows us to get a better sense of the gradual adjustment of the payout 
policy of the firms and to test whether the effect is persistent. It also allows to detect, or rule 
out, any potential anticipation effect. The results in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 of Table 2 clearly 
show that most of the increase occurs on the first year of the reform (year 0), which is consistent 
with the visual analysis of Figure 3. The non-significant 𝛽𝛽−1 coefficients indicate that there is 
no anticipation, which points toward a causal explanation. Moreover, both the estimated values 
and t-stats of the 𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽2+ coefficients collectively indicate that the effect of the tax cut on 
dividends is not short-lived.  
We conduct a series of additional tests and robustness checks. A first potential source of 
concern is the fact that some control firms did react to the fiscal shock during the post-reform 
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period. Indeed, some firms started building reserves from capital contributions to be able to 
pay some TED to their shareholders. To take care of this concern, we drop these “switching 
firms” from the analysis and re-estimate both equations (1) and (2). Doing so leads to a 
reduction in the number of observations from 1,857 to 1,680, but it does not materially change 
the overall pattern. We see in Table 3 that the coefficient associated to the treatment variable 
remains positive and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level (columns 1, 3, 5 and 
7), and the estimated dynamics remains virtually unaffected (columns 2, 4, 6 and 8). 
An alternative way to deal with switching firms is to terminate the sample period at the end 
of year 0. Doing so allows us to design a particularly clean test of the effect of removing 
dividend taxes on firm payout, but it comes at the cost of reducing both sample size and 
statistical power. We present the estimation results in columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 of Table 4. The 
estimated beta coefficients remain statistically significant at the 90% or 95% confidence levels 
for the first three variables (columns 1, 3 and 5), but their values are smaller than when we 
consider the full five years after the tax cut. The latter is consistent with the fact that the effect 
was building up over the three years following the event. For the percentage of payers, the 𝛽𝛽 
coefficient on the treatment dummy remains positive and statistically significant at the 90% 
confidence level. However, in this case, there is no drop in the value of the coefficient 
compared to Table 3 as the full adjustment is made after one year. 
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 here] 
In an auxiliary test, we exploit a specific feature of our set-up. Indeed, firms had little time 
between the announcement of the possibility to pay TED (December 2010) and their next 
general assembly (typically between March and May 2011). Indeed, some firms with potential 
reserves from capital contributions did not have enough time to file their request with the 
Federal Tax Authority and to get its approval in due time.25 As a result, such firms, although 
being theoretically eligible, had to wait an extra year to benefit from the tax cut. From an 
identification point of view, these “late firms” constitute an ideal control sample as they are 
similar to the firms treated in 2011. Our setting looks, in some respects, like the one used by 
Bernstein (2015) in his study of the effects of going public on firms’ innovation. He contrasts 
long-run innovation firms that filed to go public in the same year, but experienced different 
                                                 
25 In its 2011 annual report, Swiss company Comet states: “The distribution is expected to qualify as a tax-exempt 
repayment of contributed capital […] Confirmation of this tax-exempt status from Switzerland’s Federal Tax 
Administration is still pending at the time of writing this annual Report”. 
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post-filing stock market returns. Just like in the present test, these two groups of firms are ex 
ante similar and offer a clear identification strategy. Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 in Table 4 display 
the regression results for treated firms vs. late firms over the sample period 2007-2011. In this 
case too, we find that firms quickly and massively adjusted their payout policy after the tax 
cut. 
As an additional robustness check, we remove all firms belonging to the financial industry. 
This reduces our sample size from 1,857 to 1,336 observations. We estimate equations (1) and 
(2) with non-financial firms only and report the results in Table 5. Regardless of the payout 
variable, we obtain consistent results, which suggests the base line results are not materially 
affected by the presence of financial firms.26 Finally, as our sample is very heterogeneous in 
terms of size with some small local companies and multinational firms, we redo our tests after 
removing the bottom and top quintile of firms in terms of total assets. Results in Table A3 (in 
the Appendix) indicates that our findings are not driven by the smallest or the largest firms.  
Overall, the evidence presented above hints at a strong impact of dividend taxes on the 
payout policy of firms, which comes in contrast with the often alleged minor effect of corporate 
taxes (Myers, McConnell, Peterson, Roebuck, Soter, Stewart and Stern, 1998). More 
specifically, we cannot reject the first two hypotheses (H1 and H2) according to which a 
dividend tax cut increases both dividend payout and total payout. This empirical evidence is 
consistent with previous evidence for private firms (Yagan, 2015; Alstadsæter, Jacob and 
Michaely, 2017; Jacob and Michaely, 2017). Hence, our findings contradict both the neoclassic 
and new view of dividend taxes according to which payout policy is independent of dividend 
taxes. It is then more in line with theories that imply that reducing dividend taxes lead firms to 
immediately increase dividends, such as the signaling model of (Bernheim, 1991) or the agency 
model of Chetty and Saez (2010). 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
5.2. Investment Policy 
We now analyze whether the introduction of CTR2 had any effect on the investment policy 
of Swiss companies (Hypothesis H3). Our measures of corporate investment are the capital 
expenditures, both in log and in first difference, as well as the ratio of capital expenditures 
                                                 
26 In Tables A1 and A2, we replicate Tables 3 and 4 using non-financial firms only and obtain similar results. 
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scaled by lagged fixed assets (property, plant and equipment). This ratio is widely used in the 
empirical corporate finance literature (e.g. Almeida and Campello (2007) or Foucault and 
Fresard (2014)) to represent firm investment levels.27 As with the payout variables in Section 
5.1, we start by plotting the evolution of the average of the log of the capital expenditures. We 
observe in Figure 4 that prior to the reform, the evolution of this investment variable was 
remarkably similar for both treated and control firms. Unlike for payout, we visually do not 
detect any increase in average investment for the treated firms after the enactment of the reform. 
If anything, the average investment is increasing only for control firms following the reform. 
Next, we estimate Equation (1) using our three capex variables as the endogenous variable. 
For each variable, we estimate the main two specifications that we used for the payout variables 
in Section 5.1. Specifically, we contrast treated and control firms over the whole sample 
(columns 1-3), and treated and control firms, except “switching firms”, over the whole sample 
(columns 4-6). We report the regression results in Table 6. Overall, we do not detect any 
significant effects of the tax cut on the investment of treated firms. We can reject the H3 
hypothesis, which states that the investment increases after the dividend tax cut. This set of 
results indicate that the CTR2 did not meet one of its main objective, which was to produce 
positive real effects.  
 
[Insert Figure 4 and Table 6 here] 
Our results are in line with Yagan (2015) who reports that the 2003 dividend tax cut had no 
material effect on the investment policy of private firms in the US. This body of evidence 
clearly contradicts the neoclassical theory of dividend taxation, which focuses on the key role 
of equity and on its reduced cost following a tax cut. To better understand why reduced taxes 
on dividends did not materialize into more investment, we test whether treated firms raise 
equity (hypothesis H4). To do so, we first display in Figure 4 the log of the equity and the 
percentage of firms that conduct a seasoned equity offering on a given year. In this figure, we 
see no indication that treated firms are more prone to raise equity than their peers after the tax 
cut. We complement this visual analysis using a series of regression analyses. The estimation 
results in Panel A of Table 7 confirm that treated firms do not significantly increase their equity, 
and we obtain consistent results for the three considered variables: log(equity), percentage 
                                                 
27 We winsorize the capex-to-PPE variable at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In Table A4, we re-estimate our 
specifications on investment using different winsorizing thresholds and obtain similar results. 
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change of equity, and equity scaled by total assets.28 Given the fact that, at the same time, we 
report a sudden and large increase in total payout, the residual financial resources available to 
finance new investment is mechanically shrinking. Overall, our findings allow us to reject both 
Hypotheses H3 and H4. 
 [Insert Table 7 here] 
 As a final consistency test, we study the evolution of cash holdings before and after the 
enactment of the reform. We plot in Figure 4, the average level of the cash reserve, expressed 
in log, separately for treated and control firms. The level of cash remains quite stable for control 
firms whereas it is following a positive trend for control firms. We then estimate our main 
specifications for three variables capturing cash holdings: log(cash), percentage change of cash, 
and cash scaled by total assets. The estimation results are displayed in Panel B of Table 7. It 
appears that the coefficient associated with the treatment variable is always negative, and is 
marginally statistically significant for log(cash) and for percentage change of cash. Our 
interpretation is that the smaller growth rate of cash holdings within treated firms comes from 
the fact that these firms increased massively their payout after the tax cut. In other words, they 
retain a smaller fraction of their annual earnings compared to their peers. However, our findings 
collectively indicate that this relative contraction in cash for treated firms is not due to a boost 
in investments, as the latter did not materialize in our sample. 
6 IMPLICATIONS FOR AGENCY PROBLEMS 
We have seen in the previous sections that reducing dividend taxes induces firms to 
significantly increase their dividend payout. But because dividends remove corporate wealth 
from insider control, changing dividend taxes should also impact the level of agency problems 
(Jensen, 1986). In this section, we illustrate empirically this phenomenon, which can be seen 
as an unintended consequence of the dividend tax cut. In particular, we see that the reduction 
in available retained earnings is strongest for firms that are most exposed to agency problems. 
The question of whether dividend taxes affect agency problems appears particularly 
interesting in our setting. In terms of corporate governance, Switzerland belongs to the 
German-origin civil law countries which tend to have poor investor protection (La Porta, Lopez 
de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). This is illustrated by Switzerland ranking quite low in 
                                                 
28 We winsorize the equity/total assets variable at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In Table A5, we re-estimate our 
specifications on equity using different winsorizing thresholds and obtain similar results. 
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terms of the anti-director rights index (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998), 
anti-self-dealing index (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2008), or corporate 
governance ratings (Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2007; Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira and Matos, 
2011).  
Different types of agency problems can arise in our setting. In widely held firms, there is a 
conflict of interest between shareholders and management as the shareholders do not have the 
capacity and incentive to properly monitor the managers. Managers may potentially exert 
insufficient effort, engage in wasteful investment, pay themselves compensation and enjoy 
various perks, which eventually destroy firm value. Differently, in firms having a controlling 
shareholder, agency problems materialize through a conflict of interest between majority and 
minority shareholders. Agency problems are less severe in those firms as a large shareholder 
has strong incentives to closely monitor the management team (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 2000). 
Nevertheless, the controlling shareholder can potentially extract private benefits from 
outside shareholders. In addition to ownership structure, differences in the severity of agency 
problems can also be related to the use of control-enhancing mechanisms (CEM). Swiss firms 
mainly use two such mechanisms: multiple share classes and voting right restrictions. The 
former allows the controlling shareholder to have more control rights than cash-flow rights and 
the latter represents an anti-takeover mechanisms (in practice, the limit is set between 2 and 
10%). Both mechanisms aim to limit shareholder democracy and give more power to the 
controlling shareholder and/or the management of the firm. The use of CEM leaves more 
freedom to insiders and is potentially associated with more agency problems. Note that 39% of 
firms in our sample have one of these two kinds of CEM. Our tests exploit the cross-sectional 
variations in the level of agency problems proxied by ownership concentration or the use of 
CEM. 
We start by contrasting the reaction to the tax cut of two types of treated firms: those that 
are widely-held (19.2% of the sample) and those which have one or several blockholders 
(80.8% of the sample). We display in Figure 5 the evolution of our four payout variables for 
the two types of treated firms. This preliminary visual inspection suggests that widely-held 
firms react more strongly to the tax cut. Then, we estimate a variation of Equation (1) in which 
we break the treated variable down into two variables: one that takes a value of one if the 
treated firm is widely-held and another one that takes a value of one if the treated firm has a 
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blockholder.29 We see in Table 8 that the value of the beta coefficients on the treatment 
variables is positive and statistically significant for both types of firms, which suggests that the 
effect documented in Section 5 is widespread among all types of public firms. However, the 
value of the beta coefficient is much higher for widely-held firms. For instance, when 
modelling dividend yields in column 1, the beta coefficient is 66% higher for widely-held firms 
than for firms with a blockholder. We obtain consistent results when using dividend and payout 
ratios and the percentage of dividend payers (columns 3, 5 and 7) for which the difference in 
betas are respectively equal to 57%, 51%, and 251%. This first set of results indicates that firms 
associated with higher agency costs (i.e., widely-held firms) increase their payout significantly 
more than firms associated with lower agency costs (i.e., firms with a blockholder). 
The results are presented in columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 of Table 8. For widely-held firms, we 
observe that CEM are associated with a stronger reaction to the tax cut. We see in Table 8 that, 
for three out of the four payout variables, the beta coefficient is indeed higher for firms with 
CEM. This suggests that the firms that are more prone to severe agency problems, namely those 
without any blockholder and with control enhancing structures in place, are the ones that 
increase the most their payout. By doing so, they decrease the available retained earnings the 
most and therefore leave less room for agency problems to materialize. These findings are 
consistent with results in Berzins, Bøhren and Stacescu (2018) for private Norwegian firms. 
When turning to firms with blockholders, the situation is opposite. The beta coefficient is 
only significant for firms associated with lower agency costs (i.e., firms with a blockholder and 
no CEM). Differently, firms that have both a blockholder and some CEM in place do not 
significantly change their payout policy after the tax reduction. Our interpretation of this result 
is that these blockholders have the full control over the firm as they have the absolute majority 
of voting rights. After the tax cut, these firms do not increase payout and keep the level of 
retained earnings constant, which might be detrimental to outside shareholders. 
 [Insert Figure 5 and Table 8 here] 
7 CONCLUSION 
The distortive effect of corporate taxes is a fundamental problem in both corporate and 
public finance. In this paper, we contribute to the important debate on the impact of dividend 
                                                 
29 We define blockholders using a 10% threshold but we consider other thresholds in our robustness checks. 
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taxes on corporate decisions by focusing on the 2011 corporate tax reform in Switzerland. This 
reform gives us a quasi-experimental set-up as some firms were suddenly able to pay tax-
exempted dividends while others were not. 
The main findings from our study are the following. We find that treated firms immediately 
and massively increased payouts after the tax cut. Because the rise in dividends is not 
compensated by an equally sized drop in share repurchases, the total payout also significantly 
increased after the tax cut, or in other words, retained earnings significantly decreased. When 
turning to corporate investment, we report a zero-elasticity with respect to dividend taxes. We 
show that this comes from the fact that treated firms do not raise enough equity to compensate 
for the contraction in retained earnings. Taken together, our findings suggest that (1) 
corporations do care about the taxes faced by its shareholders, (2) dividend taxes materially 
distort financial decisions of firms as they force corporations to retain too large a fraction of 
earnings, and (3) dividend tax cuts do not seem to boost investment but can alleviate agency 
problems. 
More than 10 years after the second Corporate Taxation Reform was passed by the Swiss 
Parliament, tax-exempt dividends is still a prominent way for firms to return cash to their 
shareholders, and it is likely to remain the case for the years to come. Indeed, the latest figures 
for the year 2017 indicate that current reserves from capital contributions (required to pay tax-
exempt dividends) amount CHF1,955 Bio for all Swiss corporations, almost three times the 
Swiss GDP. Many large public firms replenished these reserves to record levels and will be 
able to pay years of tax-exempt dividends: 29 years of dividends for Credit Suisse, 19 years for 
Lonza, 14 years for Lafarge Holcim, and 13 years for UBS. 
To conclude, it is interesting to notice that the fiscal reform investigated in this paper took 
place in a country with a particularly large financial sector. Following the Global Financial 
Crisis, Swiss banks, like their international competitors, had to significantly increase their 
regulatory capital and it was costly for them to do so. Ironically, we see in this paper that this 
cost was greatly mitigated by the fact that domestic banks were allowed to use this extra capital 
to pay tax-exempt dividends to their shareholders. While the question of whether reduced taxes 
can be an efficient way to reduce the burden of banking regulation is beyond the scope of this 
paper, it should warrant further investigation. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics  
 
This table presents descriptive statistics on corporate data for the year 2010 for all sample companies, control companies and treated companies. The last two columns describe 
differences of means between the treated and control group and the associated p-values. Dividends shows four variables related to dividend payments, Firm characteristics 
different accounting variables, Investments capex, PPE and their ratio and finally Ownership & Agency gives a brief overview of the ownership structure and the use of control-
enhancing mechanisms of companies. To be considered a blockholder, a family or non-family blockholder company, the largest shareholder must hold at least 10% of voting 
rights in a company otherwise the company is denoted as widely-held. Control-enhancing mechanisms denotes companies either having multiple share classes or voting right 
restrictions. 
Nb of obs. Mean Median Nb of obs. Mean Median Nb of obs. Mean Median Difference p-value
Dividends
Dividend yield 210 2.03 2.00 114 1.99 2.00 96 2.07 2.00 -0.08 0.77           
Dividend pay-out 210 34.78 30.50 114 33.97 28.50 96 35.73 33.00 -1.76 0.70           
Total pay-out 210 36.31 32.00 114 35.58 30.50 96 37.19 34.50 -1.61 0.72           
% payers 210 69.05 100.00 114 70.18 100.00 96 67.71 100.00 2.47 0.70           
Firm characteristics
Cash & equiv. 210 1064770 97802 114 914321 77670 96 1243428 124042 -329107 0.52           
Total assets 210 14100000 829002 114 9159766 708803 96 20100000 973600 -10901275 0.18           
BV of equity 210 2187605 348179 114 1832240 285760 96 2609600 464618 -777359 0.40           
MV of equity 210 4643861 585414 114 4768620 405431 96 4495709 738332 272911 0.91           
EBIT 203 527648 40297 108 545545 37574 95 507303 61266 38241 0.88           
Net Income 210 312076 22028 114 345922 22169 96 271885 20960 74037 0.65           
Age 210 76.60 62.00 114 80.96 71.00 96 71.42 58.00 9.55 0.29           
Cash& equiv / total assets 210 16.75 11.12 114 16.54 10.12 96 17.00 12.71 -0.46 0.85           
ROA 203 2.37 3.79 108 2.32 3.77 95 2.43 3.79 -0.11 0.95           
ROE 210 2.36 7.92 114 2.25 8.75 96 2.49 7.32 -0.24 0.95           
Leverage 210 33.96 31.04 114 35.35 31.16 96 32.30 29.94 3.05 0.42           
Nb. Employees 189 7551 1328 98 6849 1062 91 8306 1808 -1457 0.59           
Salaries 199 674058 101308 110 606895 86548 89 757068 133700 -150172 0.62           
Investments
Capex 202 134242 20940 108 121262 15021 94 149155 27712 -27893 0.64           
PPE 204 820677 142951 108 763580 128550 96 884910 160036 -121331 0.72           
Capex / PPE 198 29.25 15.02 106 30.72 13.70 92 27.55 17.37 3.17 0.66           
Ownership & Agency
Widely-held 208 19.23 0.00 114 15.79 0.00 94 23.40 0.00 -0.08 0.17           
Blockholder 208 80.77 100.00 114 84.21 100.00 94 76.60 100.00 0.08 0.17           
Family 208 50.96 100.00 114 52.63 100.00 94 48.94 0.00 0.04 0.60           
Non-family blockholder 208 29.81 0.00 114 31.58 0.00 94 27.66 0.00 0.04 0.54           
Control-enhancing mechanism 208 39.42 0.00 114 47.37 0.00 94 29.79 0.00 0.18 0.01           
All Control Treated Difference of means
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Table 2 
Treatment effect on payout 
 
This table presents results of a difference-in-differences OLS regression over the period 2007-2015. The 
explained variable is, alternatively, the dividend yield (DPS over stock price), dividend payout (DPS over EPS), 
total payout (dividends + repurchases over earnings) and the % of dividend payers. Treated denotes companies 
that can pay tax exempt dividends. (y-1) denotes the treatment effect one year before the tax cut, (y0) the year 
of the tax cut, (y+1) the year after the tax cut and (y2+) two and more years after the tax cut. Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets and Age the natural logarithm of company age. All specifications use industry clustered 
robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated 0.665*** 9.221*** 9.889*** 6.725**
(3.152) (5.064) (4.527) (2.607)
Treated (y-1) 0.000 0.485 -1.406 -2.915
(0.001) (0.134) (-0.418) (-0.845)
Treated (y0) 0.473** 6.261* 6.336* 7.118*
(2.131) (1.777) (1.869) (1.704)
Treated (y+1) 0.913** 7.256** 7.448 7.574*
(2.296) (2.143) (1.686) (1.908)
Treated (y2+) 0.650** 11.267*** 11.449*** 4.919
(2.639) (4.328) (4.382) (1.590)
Size -0.116 -0.115 2.192 2.287 2.554 2.657 -0.010 -0.047
(-0.731) (-0.710) (0.823) (0.861) (0.850) (0.885) (-0.003) (-0.013)
Age 0.134 0.128 5.007 4.582 4.667 4.226 17.111 17.304
(0.246) (0.232) (0.717) (0.665) (0.632) (0.578) (1.327) (1.338)
Constant 3.210 3.227 -12.270 -12.855 -13.535 -13.951 6.610 7.191
(1.206) (1.201) (-0.272) (-0.287) (-0.258) (-0.268) (0.090) (0.097)
Observations 1,859 1,859 1,859 1,859 1,859 1,859 1,859 1,859
R-squared 0.620 0.620 0.575 0.576 0.564 0.565 0.688 0.688
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Dividend Yield % PayersDividend Payout Total Payout
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Table 3 
Treatment effect on payout without late arrivals 
 
This table presents results of a difference-in-differences OLS regression over the period 2007-2015 discarding 
companies which were treated after the shock. The explained variable is, alternatively, the dividend yield (DPS 
over stock price), dividend payout (DPS over EPS), total payout (dividends + repurchases over earnings) and the 
% of dividend payers. Treated denotes companies that can pay tax exempt dividends. (y-1) denotes the treatment 
effect one year before the tax cut, (y0) the year of the tax cut, (y+1) the year after the tax cut and (y2+) two and 
more years after the tax cut. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets and Age the natural logarithm of company 
age. All specifications use industry clustered robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated 0.681*** 8.958*** 9.492*** 8.184**
(2.983) (3.603) (3.781) (2.463)
Treated (y-1) 0.004 0.572 -1.329 -2.485
(0.024) (0.158) (-0.394) (-0.724)
Treated (y0) 0.478** 6.333* 6.405* 7.504*
(2.155) (1.787) (1.882) (1.760)
Treated (y+1) 0.995** 6.831 6.676 6.884
(2.227) (1.545) (1.343) (1.549)
Treated (y2+) 0.686** 11.595*** 11.660*** 7.764*
(2.400) (3.260) (3.601) (1.723)
Size -0.181 -0.180 1.298 1.451 2.210 2.373 -0.378 -0.353
(-0.988) (-0.955) (0.396) (0.444) (0.597) (0.642) (-0.091) (-0.085)
Age -0.071 -0.094 4.663 3.682 5.242 4.232 21.160*** 21.060***
(-0.121) (-0.157) (0.675) (0.545) (0.666) (0.544) (3.020) (2.941)
Constant 4.959 5.039 2.755 2.985 -9.736 -9.292 -7.000 -6.753
(1.651) (1.667) (0.054) (0.058) (-0.157) (-0.150) (-0.108) (-0.104)
Observations 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681
R-squared 0.623 0.623 0.575 0.575 0.564 0.564 0.713 0.713
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Dividend Yield % PayersDividend Payout Total Payout
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Table 4 
Treatment effect on payout over a restricted period and with late arrivals 
 
This table presents results of a difference-in-differences OLS regression over the period 2007-2015 comparing 
the treatment effect over a shorter period between 2007 and 2011 (columns 1, 3 and 5) and treated firms with 
respect to late treated firms only (columns 2, 4 and 6). The explained variable is, alternatively, the dividend yield 
(DPS over stock price), dividend payout (DPS over EPS), total payout (dividends + repurchases over earnings) 
and the % of dividend payers. Treated denotes companies that can pay tax exempt dividends. Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets and Age the natural logarithm of company age. All specifications use industry clustered 
robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated 0.457* 6.642** 7.328** 7.868*
(2.031) (2.110) (2.414) (1.861)
Treated vs. Late 0.608** 11.594*** 11.182*** 11.189*
(2.185) (3.143) (3.582) (1.847)
Size -0.099 -0.236 0.370 -0.270 2.624 2.878 3.064 0.632
(-0.657) (-1.084) (0.094) (-0.057) (0.608) (0.567) (0.851) (0.120)
Age 0.135 0.871 -15.612 -3.296 -19.413 -9.990 14.768 31.982**
(0.137) (0.858) (-0.865) (-0.179) (-0.963) (-0.470) (0.708) (2.068)
Constant 2.834 1.761 90.206 43.734 76.334 29.024 -31.126 -67.345
(0.691) (0.389) (1.136) (0.470) (0.886) (0.295) (-0.341) (-0.692)
Observations 1,049 675 1,049 675 1,049 675 1,049 675
R-squared 0.702 0.711 0.603 0.602 0.580 0.576 0.772 0.746
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Dividend Yield % PayersDividend Payout Total Payout
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Table 5 
Treatment effect on payout after removing financial companies 
 
This table presents results of a difference-in-differences OLS regression over the period 2007-2015 excluding 
all financial companies. The explained variable is, alternatively, the dividend yield (DPS over stock price), 
dividend payout (DPS over EPS), total payout (dividends + repurchases over earnings) and the % of dividend 
payers. Treated denotes companies that can pay tax exempt dividends. (y-1) denotes the treatment effect one 
year before the tax cut, (y0) the year of the tax cut, (y+1) the year after the tax cut and (y2+) two and more years 
after the tax cut. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets and Age the natural logarithm of company age. All 
specifications use industry clustered robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level respectively.  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated 0.690*** 8.796*** 8.880*** 5.658*
(3.014) (3.563) (3.100) (1.789)
Treated (y-1) 0.029 1.079 -1.371 0.196
(0.131) (0.247) (-0.321) (0.046)
Treated (y0) 0.529** 7.292* 6.059 10.795*
(2.246) (1.840) (1.414) (1.953)
Treated (y+1) 0.771 4.607 4.260 5.276
(1.693) (1.083) (0.753) (1.079)
Treated (y2+) 0.736*** 11.365*** 10.979*** 3.917
(2.880) (3.225) (3.072) (1.055)
Size 0.101* 0.104* 5.743*** 5.824*** 6.402*** 6.508*** 4.136 4.018
(1.851) (1.866) (3.299) (3.395) (3.050) (3.143) (1.247) (1.189)
Age 0.392 0.378 7.436 7.008 7.324 6.751 30.931*** 31.495***
(0.659) (0.624) (0.959) (0.912) (0.817) (0.759) (2.966) (2.939)
Constant -1.154 -1.162 -70.564 -71.181 -75.460 -75.607 -106.894* -106.732
(-0.505) (-0.500) (-1.575) (-1.618) (-1.412) (-1.447) (-1.712) (-1.695)
Observations 1,338 1,338 1,338 1,338 1,338 1,338 1,338 1,338
R-squared 0.547 0.547 0.550 0.551 0.549 0.550 0.680 0.680
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Dividend Yield % PayersDividend Payout Total Payout
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Table 6 
Treatment effect on corporate investment 
 
This table presents results of a difference-in-differences OLS regression over the period 2007-2015 comparing 
treated firms to control firms (columns 1 to 3) and treated firms to a control group discarding late arrivals (columns 
4 to 6). The explained variable is, alternatively, the natural logarithm of capex, the ratio of capex over lagged PPE 
and the 1-year percentage change in capex. The two ratios are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Treated 
denotes companies that can pay tax exempt dividends. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets and Age the 
natural logarithm of company age. All specifications use industry clustered robust standard errors. *, **, *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated -0.092 -1.176 -1.395
(-1.000) (-0.694) (-0.168)
Treated w/out late -0.121 -1.287 0.037
(-1.192) (-0.627) (0.003)
Size 0.694*** -8.436*** -36.444*** 0.681*** -6.787*** -29.126***
(8.727) (-4.500) (-5.092) (7.891) (-3.382) (-3.549)
Age -0.152 -3.855 -14.892 -0.224* -6.322* -16.550
(-1.276) (-1.164) (-1.318) (-1.833) (-2.034) (-1.131)
Constant 1.268 149.924*** 574.902*** 1.830 139.124*** 482.176***
(0.989) (4.534) (4.542) (1.297) (3.657) (3.135)
Observations 1,275 1,275 1,270 1,165 1,165 1,160
R-squared 0.946 0.645 0.170 0.951 0.674 0.191
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
capex / PPE % Δcapexcapex
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Table 7 
Treatment effect on financing sources  
 
This table presents results of a difference-in differences OLS regression over the period 2007-2015 comparing 
treated firms to control firms (columns 1 to 3) and treated firms to a control group discarding late arrivals (columns 
4 to 6). In Panel A, the explained variable is, alternatively, the natural logarithm of the book value of equity, the 
ratio of book value of equity over total assets, and the 1-year percentage change in book value of equity. In Panel 
B, the explained variable is, alternatively, the natural logarithm of cash, the ratio of cash over total assets, and the 
1-year percentage change in cash. All ratios are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Treated denotes 
companies that can pay tax exempt dividends. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets and Age the natural 
logarithm of company age. All specifications use industry clustered robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated 0.043 2.426 -6.616
(0.766) (1.154) (-1.590)
Treated w/out late 0.022 1.794 -8.550*
(0.412) (0.965) (-1.996)
Size 0.729*** 1.598 -34.051*** 0.714*** 0.816 -31.830***
(15.270) (0.783) (-5.253) (12.731) (0.441) (-6.034)
Age 0.141 1.798 -4.792 0.137 2.335 -6.832
(0.866) (0.513) (-0.747) (0.750) (0.603) (-1.049)
Constant 2.394** 22.092 489.226*** 2.636** 31.057 470.207***
(2.340) (0.657) (6.077) (2.222) (0.931) (6.898)
Observations 1,277 1,277 1,277 1,166 1,166 1,166
R-squared 0.977 0.838 0.332 0.977 0.847 0.361
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated -0.193* -0.673 -25.053**
(-1.803) (-0.544) (-2.071)
Treated w/out late -0.222* -0.677 -25.177*
(-1.903) (-0.523) (-1.976)
Size 0.401*** -4.477** -68.307*** 0.496*** -4.259* -74.658***
(3.841) (-2.734) (-4.185) (3.196) (-2.034) (-3.829)
Age -0.036 1.155 24.307 -0.201 -0.088 34.801
(-0.109) (0.323) (0.777) (-0.678) (-0.026) (1.117)
Constant 6.208*** 71.733** 864.953*** 5.630** 74.134** 901.812***
(3.568) (2.713) (4.132) (2.062) (2.343) (3.680)
Observations 1,215 1,215 1,193 1,109 1,109 1,091
R-squared 0.871 0.718 0.177 0.877 0.720 0.203
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Panel B: cash
cash cash / total assets % Δcash
Panel A: equity
BV equity BV equity / total assets % ΔBV equity
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    Table 8 
Agency costs 
 
This table presents results of a difference-in-differences OLS regression over the period 2007-2015 for treated 
companies with a blockholder or being widely-held (columns 1, 3, 5 and 7) and depending on the presence of 
control-enhancing mechanisms in either group (columns 2, 4, 6 and 8). The explained variable is, alternatively, 
the dividend yield (DPS over stock price), dividend payout (DPS over EPS), total payout (dividends + repurchases 
over earnings) and the % of dividend payers. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets and Age the natural 
logarithm of company age. All specifications use industry clustered robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated (widely-held) 0.970** 12.686*** 13.209*** 14.517***
(2.487) (3.489) (3.176) (3.161)
Treated (widely-held with CEM) 0.913*** 16.245*** 18.324*** 27.275***
(8.224) (8.791) (9.660) (8.240)
Treated widely-held w/out CEM) 1.017** 13.002*** 13.589*** 14.488***
(2.417) (3.261) (2.947) (2.943)
Treated (blockholder) 0.583** 8.010*** 8.714*** 4.138*
(2.591) (4.425) (3.542) (1.794)
Treated (blockholder with CEM) 0.223 4.093 3.690 -0.410
(0.629) (0.923) (0.629) (-0.063)
Treated (blockholder w/out CEM) 0.793** 10.277*** 11.619*** 6.727*
(2.440) (3.448) (3.551) (1.950)
Size -0.163 -0.132 0.346 0.675 0.717 1.139 -2.574 -2.198
(-1.040) (-0.906) (0.150) (0.309) (0.254) (0.419) (-0.857) (-0.758)
Age 0.119 0.062 5.837 5.254 5.422 4.680 16.311 15.725
(0.211) (0.110) (0.839) (0.792) (0.727) (0.644) (1.263) (1.262)
Constant 3.953 3.759 10.346 8.101 9.315 6.418 46.359 43.486
(1.427) (1.394) (0.250) (0.206) (0.185) (0.135) (0.678) (0.654)
Observations 1,823 1,823 1,823 1,823 1,823 1,823 1,823 1,823
R-squared 0.617 0.619 0.576 0.577 0.565 0.566 0.688 0.689
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Yield Dividend Pay-out Total Pay-out % payers
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Figure 1 
Payout in Switzerland 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure represents the proportion of firms listed on the Swiss stock exchange (SIX) that pay dividends 
(taxed or tax-exempt), that pay tax-exempt dividends, and that repurchase their shares. 
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Figure 2 
Impact of the reform on the composition of shareholder’ equity 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure presents how the second Corporate Taxation Reform (CTR2) modified the composition of the 
shareholder’s equity in corporate balance sheets. After the reform, any company incorporated in Switzerland can 
pay tax-exempt dividends from its reserves from capital contribution (in red). The latter are created from paid-in 
capital from shareholders and need to be approved by the Federal Tax Authority. 
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Figure 3 
Impact of the dividend tax cut on payout 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: These figures represent the time series of annual average payout variable for firms in the treatment group 
(Treated) and in the control group (Control). Firms in the treatment group are firms that had recognized reserves 
from capital contribution in 2011 and were authorized to pay tax-exempted dividends, while those in the control 
group did not have such reserves and could not pay tax-exempted dividends. The year 2011 is post-reform. 
Dividend or total payout is, respectively, the fraction of earnings paid as dividends or as dividends and repurchases 
cumulated. Dividend yield is the dividend per share divided by the year-end price. Percentage of firms paying 
dividends is the fraction of firms paying a dividend to their shareholders in the control and treatment groups.  
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Figure 4 
Impact of the dividend tax cut on corporate investment, equity, and cash 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: These figures represent the time series of annual average of variables representing investment, equity, and 
cash for firms in the treatment group (Treated) and in the control group (Control). Firms in the treatment group 
are firms that had recognized reserves from capital contribution in 2011 and were authorized to pay tax-exempted 
dividends, while those in the control group did not have such reserve and could not pay tax-exempted dividends. 
The year 2011 is post-reform. 
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Figure 5 
Impact of the dividend tax cut on payout according to ownership structures 
 
 
 
 
Notes: These figures represent the time series of annual average payout variable for firms in the treatment group. 
Treated firms are divided into those that are widely-held (Treated WH) and that have one or several blockholders 
(Treated BH). We define blockholders using a 10% threshold. The year 2011 is post-reform. Dividend / total 
payout is the fraction of earnings paid as dividends or as dividends and repurchases cumulated. Dividend yield is 
the dividend per share divided by the year-end price. Percentage of firms paying dividends is the fraction of firms 
paying a dividend to their shareholders in the control and treatment groups. 
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Table A1 
Impact of the tax cut without late arrivals - without financial companies 
 
Notes: This table presents results of a difference-in-differences OLS regression over the period 2007-2015 
discarding companies which were treated after the shock. We analyse the dividend yield (DPS over stock price), 
dividend payout (DPS over EPS), total payout (dividends + repurchases over earnings) and the % of dividend 
payers. Treated denotes companies exempt from paying dividend taxes. (y-1) denotes the treatment effect one 
year before the tax cut, (y0) the year of the tax cut, (y+1) the year after the tax cut and (y2+) two and more years 
after the tax cut. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets and Age the natural logarithm of company age. All 
specifications use industry clustered robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated 0.749*** 8.214** 8.430** 9.344**
(2.931) (2.479) (2.549) (2.355)
Treated (y-1) 0.026 1.052 -1.411 0.104
(0.115) (0.239) (-0.327) (0.024)
Treated (y0) 0.533** 7.294* 6.032 10.875*
(2.252) (1.814) (1.396) (1.963)
Treated (y+1) 0.846* 2.977 2.593 4.914
(1.710) (0.562) (0.410) (0.931)
Treated (y2+) 0.861** 11.335** 11.397** 10.123*
(2.761) (2.325) (2.541) (2.004)
Size 0.076 0.082 5.560** 5.712** 6.917** 7.110*** 3.854 3.894
(1.117) (1.117) (2.643) (2.761) (2.665) (2.798) (1.109) (1.118)
Age 0.158 0.118 6.045 5.328 6.226 5.234 24.539*** 24.477***
(0.255) (0.187) (0.825) (0.743) (0.681) (0.580) (3.012) (2.896)
Constant 0.115 0.127 -60.785 -61.893 -76.222 -76.756 -81.284 -82.044
(0.048) (0.051) (-1.388) (-1.436) (-1.331) (-1.364) (-1.367) (-1.376)
Observations 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213
R-squared 0.552 0.553 0.553 0.555 0.551 0.553 0.705 0.705
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
% PayersDividend Yield Dividend Payout Total Payout
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Table A2 
Treatment effect on payout over a restricted period and with late arrivals - without financial 
companies 
 
This table presents results of a difference-in differences OLS regression over the period 2007-2015 comparing the 
treatment effect over a shorter period between 2007 and 2011 (columns 1, 3 and 5) and treated firms to late treated 
firms only (columns 2, 4 and 6). We analyse the dividend yield (DPS over stock price), dividend payout (DPS 
over EPS), total payout (dividends + repurchases over earnings) and the % of dividend payers. Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets and Age the natural logarithm of company age. All specifications use industry clustered 
robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated 0.509* 7.250* 6.718* 10.756*
(2.045) (1.885) (1.773) (1.918)
Treated vs. Late 0.566* 12.522** 10.064** 12.995
(1.803) (2.699) (2.781) (1.602)
Size 0.003 -0.049 2.974 2.807 5.467 6.206 3.988 2.726
(0.026) (-0.369) (1.067) (0.882) (1.579) (1.593) (0.976) (0.545)
Age 0.409 1.122 -11.828 1.131 -16.726 -7.213 21.231 39.104**
(0.368) (0.981) (-0.544) (0.050) (-0.680) (-0.270) (0.870) (2.295)
Constant -0.022 -2.243 35.418 -20.670 25.415 -28.051 -73.937 -129.727
(-0.005) (-0.463) (0.401) (-0.208) (0.261) (-0.261) (-0.690) (-1.289)
Observations 765 513 765 513 765 513 765 513
R-squared 0.649 0.640 0.585 0.584 0.576 0.571 0.764 0.733
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Total Payout % PayersDividend Yield Dividend Payout
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Table A3 
Treatment effect on payout – without largest or smallest companies 
 
This table presents results of a difference-in-differences OLS regression over the period 2006-2014. We analyse 
the dividend yield (DPS over stock price), dividend payout (DPS over EPS), total payout (dividends + repurchases 
over earnings) and the % of dividend payers. Treated denotes companies exempt from paying dividend taxes. (y-
1) denotes the treatment effect one year before the tax cut, (y0) the year of the tax cut, (y+1) the year after the tax 
cut and (y2+) two and more years after the tax cut. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets and age the natural 
logarithm of company age. Panel A (B) reports results for a sample without the top (bottom) quintile companies 
in terms of total assets. All specifications use industry clustered robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated 0.723*** 9.156*** 8.689*** 6.742**
(3.314) (4.014) (3.309) (2.081)
Treated (y-1) -0.003 0.334 -2.085 -3.273
(-0.016) (0.090) (-0.585) (-0.734)
Treated (y0) 0.602** 7.710* 6.514 9.438*
(2.610) (1.982) (1.601) (1.865)
Treated (y+1) 0.946* 6.285 4.816 6.751
(1.908) (1.454) (0.953) (1.331)
Treated (y2+) 0.689*** 10.940*** 9.979*** 4.104
(3.036) (3.532) (3.182) (1.046)
Size -0.073 -0.074 2.817 2.897 3.267 3.370 1.058 0.981
(-0.461) (-0.453) (1.027) (1.053) (1.058) (1.088) (0.285) (0.262)
Age 0.180 0.180 2.202 1.925 2.565 2.221 17.026 17.337
(0.321) (0.318) (0.317) (0.277) (0.311) (0.271) (1.210) (1.224)
Constant 2.011 2.020 -14.137 -14.137 -16.719 -16.732 -0.956 -1.094
(0.865) (0.866) (-0.317) (-0.319) (-0.315) (-0.318) (-0.013) (-0.014)
Observations 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488
R-squared 0.604 0.604 0.580 0.581 0.573 0.574 0.677 0.677
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated 0.614** 8.256*** 9.414*** 6.463**
(2.369) (3.758) (3.595) (2.262)
Treated (y-1) 0.063 -0.407 -2.276 -2.405
(0.331) (-0.099) (-0.624) (-0.601)
Treated (y0) 0.396 6.544 7.077* 7.638
(1.658) (1.632) (1.832) (1.641)
Treated (y+1) 0.779* 6.415 7.240 8.837**
(2.030) (1.548) (1.396) (2.261)
Treated (y2+) 0.666* 9.375*** 10.029*** 4.066
(1.958) (3.336) (3.364) (1.100)
Size -0.487** -0.481** -3.339 -3.265 -2.388 -2.326 -10.433* -10.556*
(-2.130) (-2.068) (-0.891) (-0.881) (-0.471) (-0.459) (-1.888) (-1.904)
Age 0.547 0.530 5.380 5.147 4.292 4.028 20.011 20.279
(0.855) (0.818) (0.567) (0.545) (0.446) (0.421) (1.125) (1.140)
Constant 6.910* 6.891* 62.487 62.321 58.944 59.096 161.416* 162.156*
(2.028) (2.002) (1.095) (1.103) (0.752) (0.758) (1.944) (1.945)
Observations 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488 1,488
R-squared 0.598 0.599 0.516 0.516 0.495 0.496 0.574 0.575
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Dividend Yield Dividend Payout Total Payout % Payers
Panel A: sample without top quintile companies
Panel B: sample without bottom quintile companies
Dividend Yield Dividend Payout Total Payout % Payers
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Table A4 
Treatment effect on corporate investment – alternative winsorizing threshold 
 
This table presents results of a difference-in-differences OLS regression over the period 2007-2015 comparing 
treated firms to control firms (columns 1 to 3) and treated firms to a control group discarding late arrivals (columns 
4 to 6). The explained variable is, alternatively, the natural logarithm of capex, the ratio of capex over lagged PPE 
and the 1-year change in capex. The two ratios are winsorized at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. Treated denotes 
companies that can pay tax exempt dividends. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets and Age the natural 
logarithm of company age. All specifications use industry clustered robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated -0.092 -1.891 -3.797
(-1.000) (-1.265) (-0.493)
Treated w/out late -0.121 -2.026 -2.984
(-1.192) (-1.112) (-0.298)
Size 0.694*** -6.326*** -37.794*** 0.681*** -5.347*** -30.976***
(8.727) (-4.871) (-6.060) (7.891) (-3.264) (-4.479)
Age -0.152 -2.605 -13.763 -0.224* -5.123* -15.615
(-1.276) (-0.884) (-1.152) (-1.833) (-1.760) (-1.040)
Constant 1.268 116.436*** 589.791*** 1.830 114.675*** 505.299***
(0.989) (4.627) (5.166) (1.297) (3.545) (3.656)
Observations 1,275 1,275 1,270 1,165 1,165 1,160
R-squared 0.946 0.641 0.170 0.951 0.654 0.192
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
capex capex / PPE % Δcapex
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Table A5 
Treatment effect on financing options – alternative winsorizing threshold 
 
This table presents results of a difference-in differences OLS regression over the period 2007-2015 comparing 
treated firms to control firms (columns 1 to 3) and treated firms to a control group discarding late arrivals (columns 
4 to 6). In Panel A, the explained variable is, alternatively, the natural logarithm of the book value of equity, the 
ratio of book value of equity over total assets, and the 1-year percentage change in book value of equity. In Panel 
B, the explained variable is, alternatively, the natural logarithm of cash, the ratio of cash over total assets, and the 
1-year percentage change in cash. All ratios are winsorized at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. Treated denotes 
companies that can pay tax exempt dividends. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets and Age the natural 
logarithm of company age. All specifications use industry clustered robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated 0.043 2.460 -3.834
(0.766) (1.213) (-1.447)
Treated w/out late 0.022 1.913 -5.264**
(0.412) (1.059) (-2.071)
Size 0.729*** 1.846 -22.647*** 0.714*** 0.960 -21.525***
(15.270) (0.924) (-6.266) (12.731) (0.507) (-7.372)
Age 0.141 1.704 -4.823 0.137 2.091 -6.285
(0.866) (0.483) (-1.017) (0.750) (0.530) (-1.334)
Constant 2.394** 19.004 332.912*** 2.636** 29.950 325.281***
(2.340) (0.570) (7.896) (2.222) (0.872) (9.047)
Observations 1,277 1,277 1,277 1,166 1,166 1,166
R-squared 0.977 0.837 0.349 0.977 0.846 0.371
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated -0.193* -0.628 -14.446*
(-1.803) (-0.519) (-1.918)
Treated w/out late -0.222* -0.644 -16.640**
(-1.903) (-0.510) (-2.057)
Size 0.401*** -3.972** -47.626*** 0.496*** -3.697* -47.727***
(3.841) (-2.659) (-4.865) (3.196) (-1.952) (-4.319)
Age -0.036 1.050 33.109 -0.201 -0.158 38.216
(-0.109) (0.310) (1.346) (-0.678) (-0.050) (1.471)
Constant 6.208*** 65.061** 533.953*** 5.630** 66.559** 512.833***
(3.568) (2.677) (4.070) (2.062) (2.326) (3.249)
Observations 1,215 1,215 1,193 1,109 1,109 1,091
R-squared 0.871 0.713 0.150 0.877 0.719 0.167
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
cash cash / total assets % Δcash
Panel A: equity
BV equity BV equity / total assets % ΔBV equity
Panel B: cash
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